No hay prisa, talves, para que adelantar lo inevitable, si no puedo saber cuando terminara el mundo, como sabre cuando llegara ella? aun asi, tengo "fe" y espero que esa vida a futuro, no este muy lejana de mi presente, quiero llegar a ella pensando en el pasado y diciendo " Valio la pena! " solo me resta escribir Que Bonito es lo Bonito!
miércoles, julio 14, 2010
Nation Assistance and/or Support to Counterinsurgency: Nation assistance is civil or
military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s
territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually
concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support
a host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive
institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. These programs can be
security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance
(HCA).
Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense
articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant,
loan, credit, or cash sales.
FID programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support
provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military
support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter
these threats. Typically, US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on
helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the
government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such
as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate
in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries
surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. FID is a principal
special operations mission.
HCA programs are provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and
must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the
local populace. They generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:
medical, dental and veterinary care, construction of surface transportation systems, well
drilling, and construction or repair of sanitation and public facilities. (JP 3-07, Chapter
III, para 2i)
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: These operations normally relocate threatened
noncombatants from a foreign country. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced
by diplomatic considerations. Ideally, these operations meet with little or no opposition,
however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat
operation. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a
force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. They differ
from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and
the evacuation force. The DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American
citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the
Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that
address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a
foreign country. Examples of NEO are Operations EASTERN EXIT, conducted in Somalia
in 1991, and QUICK LIFT, in 1991 in Zaire. (JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2j)
24 Military Operations Other Than War
Peace Operations (PO): PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach
a long-term political settlement and are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in
support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. Military PO are categorized
as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and PEO.
PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute,
designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic
efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PEO are the application of military force,
or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance
with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO,
PEO does not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.
US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. In
addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic
peace activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. (JP 3-07, Chapter
III, para 2k)
Protection of Shipping: When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels,
US citizens, and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters.
Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine
operations, and environmental defense. It requires the coordinated employment of surface,
air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both
ashore and afloat, and a logistics base.
Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations,
land- or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position
from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. Threats not neutralized by area operations
must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Escorts are associated with convoys,
although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific
purpose. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping
and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is
Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. (JP 3-07, Chapter
III, para 2l)
25
Intentionally Blank
26 Military Operations Other Than War
Recovery Operations
Support to Insurgency
Strikes and Raids
Show of Force Operations
Conducted
to search for,
locate, identify,
rescue and return
personnel, human
remains, equipment,
or items critical to
national security
Demonstrate US
resolve and involve
increased visibility of
US deployed forces
in order to defuse
a specific
situation
These operations
are conducted to
inflict damage on,
seize, or destroy an
objective for
political
purposes.
An
insurgency
is an organized
movement aimed at
overthrowing a
constituted
government through
the use of subversion
and armed conflict
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Types of MOOTW:4
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 7d
Slide 10. Types of MOOTW:4
27
Types of MOOTW:4
Recovery Operations: Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify,
rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to
national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed
planning in order to execute them. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. (JP 3-07,
Chapter III, para 2m)
Show of Force Operations: These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve
increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if
allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. US forces
deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional
influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. Show of force
operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes.
(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2n)
Strikes and Raids: Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize,
or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending
nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from
launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving
swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy
installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2o)
Support to Insurgency: An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow
of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US
Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US
forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not
themselves conduct combat operations. (JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2p)
We have just discussed several operations that are representative of a wide range of MOOTW.
We will now go on to discuss the planning considerations of MOOTW.
28 Military Operations Other Than War
Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war.
WAR MOOTW
Mission
Analysis
Command
Estimate
Mission
Analysis
Command
Estimate
Potential Threat
Define Understand Appreciate
Plans for
War
Plans for
MOOTW
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 8
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW
Slide 11. Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW
29
Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW
Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war. The mission analysis
and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in
planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the
development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats.
Moreover, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment
package and commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to
quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2)
30 Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR" 12
Military Operations Other ThanWar (MOOTW)
1
MOOTW Command and Control Options
US Unilateral Operations
Multinational Operations
Interoperability of
Communications is Critical to
Success
No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their
subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to
meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.
Extend a Communications
Umbrella over Multinational
Forces
Unity
of
Effort
US Civil
Authorities
Lead Nation
Option
Parallel
Option
Federal,
State, and
Local
Agencies
Regional
Alliance
Option
Slide 12. Unit Integrity
31
Unit Integrity
Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best
able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. When personnel and elements are
drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. Even if political restraints on an
operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select
smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained
and operated together. When deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations,
commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements
that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures.
In order to provide JFCs with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit
integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate
independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. (JP 3-07,
Chapter IV, para 2a)
32 Military Operations Other Than War
Slide 13. Intelligence and Information Gathering
33
Intelligence and Information Gathering
Since MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence, a single source
approach cannot support all requirements. Some sources of intelligence are: manned and
unmanned aerial intelligence sensors, remote sensing systems, data from space systems,
sensors on space and aerial platforms. Communications systems using space-based resources
can provide secure, reliable dissemination of intelligence and other information where there
is little or no existing communications infrastructure.
In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, human intelligence (HUMINT) may
provide the most useful source of information. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence
sources with psychological information not available through technical means. Specific
essential elements of information which drive collection management process in MOOTW
may differ in focus from those targeted in war. Intelligence collection in MOOTW often
requires a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect
the situation. It will demand a depth of expertise in all aspects of the operational environment,
including the people, their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors.
Intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the area of
responsibility and/or joint operations area, to include capabilities and limitations of major
seaports, airfields, and surface lines of communications.
In MOOTW involving coordination or interaction with nongovernmental organizations
(NGO) or private voluntary organizations (PVO) and UN operations, the term “information
gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” This will help military
forces to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their
valuable knowledge.
Counterintelligence operations are as important in MOOTW as they are in war. Protection
of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded, to counter
belligerent HUMINT efforts. Members of NGOs and PVOs working closely with US forces
may pass information to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with the mission.
Equally important is their critical role during multinational MOOTW in establishing
procedures and safeguards regarding the protection, handling, and release of classified or
sensitive information to coalition partners, allies, and supported elements. JFCs must be
alert to the possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by
a coalition partner. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2b)
34 Military Operations Other Than War
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Multinational Operations
11
When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs
should assign missions based on each multinational partner’s
capabilities.
Political
Climates
Language
Barriers
Cultural
Backgrounds
Military
Capabilities
Equipment
Interoperability
Logistic
Support
System
Coordination
Language
Training
Cross-
Cultural
Training
Regional
Orientation
Forward
Deployment
Small Unit
Actions
Multinational
Operations
Considerations
Special
Operations
Forces
Slide 14. Multinational Operations
35
Multinational Operations
Multinational operations planning should take into account the following considerations:
political climates, language barriers, cultural backgrounds, military capabilities and training,
equipment interoperability and logistic support system coordination.
When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions
based on each multinational partner’s capabilities. Each nation’s political considerations
will influence its degree of involvement in a specific MOOTW. Early determination and
resolution of these considerations with partner nations during the planning process is critical.
JFCs should plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting
multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different
military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational
partners.
Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to
overcome these detractors. SOF-unique capabilities in language and cross cultural training,
regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions,
make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support multinational
operations objectives. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2c)
36 Military Operations Other Than War
No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their
subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet
specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.
US Unilateral Operations Multinational Operations
Interoperability of
Communication is Critical to
Success
Extend a Communications
Umbrella over Multinational
Forces
Unity
of
Effort
Lead Nation
Option
US Civil
Authorities
Federal,
State, and
Local
Agencies
Parallel
Option
Regional
Alliance
Option
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 12
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
MOOTW Command and Control Options
Slide 15. MOOTW Command and Control Options
37
MOOTW Command and Control Options
No single command and control (C2) option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their
subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific
requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must
be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided.
Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation. In US
unilateral operations, C2 arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US
civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign
operations. C2 arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with
unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies. In a
disaster situation, routine communications may be disrupted and civil authorities may have
to rely on backup communications systems. Military leaders should be prepared to establish
communication linkages with these authorities. Outside the United States, even when US
forces operate unilaterally, some communications links will be required with local civil
authorities or international agencies, depending on the situation.
Planners must be prepared to extend a communications umbrella over multinational forces.
Some effective options for C2 of multinational forces include: the lead nation option, where
a nation agrees to take the lead in the accomplishment of an international mandate. This
simplifies unity of command; the parallel option, which allows multinational partners to
retain greater operational control of their forces. The mandating organization selects a
commander for the force. The force commander has operational control of forces of the
multinational partners, but to a lesser degree than in the lead nation option; the regional
alliance option, which depends on the ability of regional nations to lead a coalition effort.
Existing alliances may serve as a basis for C2 of forces involved in MOOTW. (JP 3-07,
Chapter IV, para 2d)
38 Military Operations Other Than War
The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes
planning for public affairs more important than ever. This is especially critical
in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact.
Public Affairs
•
Open and Independent
Reporting
•
Respond to Media
Queries
Public
Perception
•
Create Environment
That Encourages
Balanced Coverage
•
Pre-Plan Response to
Inaccurate Analysis and
Disinformation
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 13
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Public Affairs
Slide 16. Public Affairs
39
Public Affairs
The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for
public affairs more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW,
where there can be significant political impact. The media can affect the perceived legitimacy
of an operation and, therefore, influence the success or failure of that operation. JFCs
should develop a well-defined and concise public affairs plan to minimize adverse effect
upon the operation by the media, and include their public affairs officer early in the planning
process.
Public affairs plans should provide open and independent reporting and provide ways to
communicate information about an operation to fulfill the US military’s obligation of keeping
the American public informed. Such a plan also enhances force protection to avoid the
media attempts to acquire and publicly disseminate classified information. Public affairs
plans must also anticipate and pre-plan response to possibly inaccurate media analysis. (JP
3-07, Chapter IV, para 2e)
40 Military Operations Other Than War
CA units contain a variety of specialty skill that support MOOTW. CA
capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational
requirements.
Assessments
of Civil
Infrastructure
Civil Affairs
Assist
Operation of
Temporary
Shelters Liaison
Between
Military and
NGOs & PVOs
Culture EXPERTISE
Host-Nation
Support
Social
Structure
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 14
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Civil Affairs (CA)
Slide 17. Civil Affairs (CA)
41
Civil Affairs
Civil affairs (CA) units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA
capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units
may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary
shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and PVOs. CA forces
can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations such as culture,
social structure, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting
activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments.
(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2f)
military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s
territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually
concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support
a host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive
institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. These programs can be
security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance
(HCA).
Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense
articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant,
loan, credit, or cash sales.
FID programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support
provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military
support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter
these threats. Typically, US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on
helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the
government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such
as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate
in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries
surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. FID is a principal
special operations mission.
HCA programs are provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and
must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the
local populace. They generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:
medical, dental and veterinary care, construction of surface transportation systems, well
drilling, and construction or repair of sanitation and public facilities. (JP 3-07, Chapter
III, para 2i)
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: These operations normally relocate threatened
noncombatants from a foreign country. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced
by diplomatic considerations. Ideally, these operations meet with little or no opposition,
however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat
operation. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a
force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. They differ
from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and
the evacuation force. The DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American
citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the
Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that
address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a
foreign country. Examples of NEO are Operations EASTERN EXIT, conducted in Somalia
in 1991, and QUICK LIFT, in 1991 in Zaire. (JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2j)
24 Military Operations Other Than War
Peace Operations (PO): PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach
a long-term political settlement and are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in
support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. Military PO are categorized
as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and PEO.
PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute,
designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic
efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PEO are the application of military force,
or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance
with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO,
PEO does not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.
US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. In
addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic
peace activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. (JP 3-07, Chapter
III, para 2k)
Protection of Shipping: When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels,
US citizens, and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters.
Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine
operations, and environmental defense. It requires the coordinated employment of surface,
air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both
ashore and afloat, and a logistics base.
Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations,
land- or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position
from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. Threats not neutralized by area operations
must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Escorts are associated with convoys,
although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific
purpose. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping
and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is
Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. (JP 3-07, Chapter
III, para 2l)
25
Intentionally Blank
26 Military Operations Other Than War
Recovery Operations
Support to Insurgency
Strikes and Raids
Show of Force Operations
Conducted
to search for,
locate, identify,
rescue and return
personnel, human
remains, equipment,
or items critical to
national security
Demonstrate US
resolve and involve
increased visibility of
US deployed forces
in order to defuse
a specific
situation
These operations
are conducted to
inflict damage on,
seize, or destroy an
objective for
political
purposes.
An
insurgency
is an organized
movement aimed at
overthrowing a
constituted
government through
the use of subversion
and armed conflict
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Types of MOOTW:4
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 7d
Slide 10. Types of MOOTW:4
27
Types of MOOTW:4
Recovery Operations: Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify,
rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to
national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed
planning in order to execute them. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. (JP 3-07,
Chapter III, para 2m)
Show of Force Operations: These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve
increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if
allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. US forces
deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional
influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. Show of force
operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes.
(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2n)
Strikes and Raids: Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize,
or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending
nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from
launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving
swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy
installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2o)
Support to Insurgency: An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow
of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US
Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US
forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not
themselves conduct combat operations. (JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2p)
We have just discussed several operations that are representative of a wide range of MOOTW.
We will now go on to discuss the planning considerations of MOOTW.
28 Military Operations Other Than War
Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war.
WAR MOOTW
Mission
Analysis
Command
Estimate
Mission
Analysis
Command
Estimate
Potential Threat
Define Understand Appreciate
Plans for
War
Plans for
MOOTW
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 8
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW
Slide 11. Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW
29
Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW
Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war. The mission analysis
and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in
planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the
development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats.
Moreover, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment
package and commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to
quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2)
30 Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR" 12
Military Operations Other ThanWar (MOOTW)
1
MOOTW Command and Control Options
US Unilateral Operations
Multinational Operations
Interoperability of
Communications is Critical to
Success
No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their
subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to
meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.
Extend a Communications
Umbrella over Multinational
Forces
Unity
of
Effort
US Civil
Authorities
Lead Nation
Option
Parallel
Option
Federal,
State, and
Local
Agencies
Regional
Alliance
Option
Slide 12. Unit Integrity
31
Unit Integrity
Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best
able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. When personnel and elements are
drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. Even if political restraints on an
operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select
smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained
and operated together. When deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations,
commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements
that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures.
In order to provide JFCs with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit
integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate
independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. (JP 3-07,
Chapter IV, para 2a)
32 Military Operations Other Than War
Slide 13. Intelligence and Information Gathering
33
Intelligence and Information Gathering
Since MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence, a single source
approach cannot support all requirements. Some sources of intelligence are: manned and
unmanned aerial intelligence sensors, remote sensing systems, data from space systems,
sensors on space and aerial platforms. Communications systems using space-based resources
can provide secure, reliable dissemination of intelligence and other information where there
is little or no existing communications infrastructure.
In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, human intelligence (HUMINT) may
provide the most useful source of information. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence
sources with psychological information not available through technical means. Specific
essential elements of information which drive collection management process in MOOTW
may differ in focus from those targeted in war. Intelligence collection in MOOTW often
requires a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect
the situation. It will demand a depth of expertise in all aspects of the operational environment,
including the people, their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors.
Intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the area of
responsibility and/or joint operations area, to include capabilities and limitations of major
seaports, airfields, and surface lines of communications.
In MOOTW involving coordination or interaction with nongovernmental organizations
(NGO) or private voluntary organizations (PVO) and UN operations, the term “information
gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” This will help military
forces to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their
valuable knowledge.
Counterintelligence operations are as important in MOOTW as they are in war. Protection
of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded, to counter
belligerent HUMINT efforts. Members of NGOs and PVOs working closely with US forces
may pass information to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with the mission.
Equally important is their critical role during multinational MOOTW in establishing
procedures and safeguards regarding the protection, handling, and release of classified or
sensitive information to coalition partners, allies, and supported elements. JFCs must be
alert to the possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by
a coalition partner. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2b)
34 Military Operations Other Than War
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Multinational Operations
11
When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs
should assign missions based on each multinational partner’s
capabilities.
Political
Climates
Language
Barriers
Cultural
Backgrounds
Military
Capabilities
Equipment
Interoperability
Logistic
Support
System
Coordination
Language
Training
Cross-
Cultural
Training
Regional
Orientation
Forward
Deployment
Small Unit
Actions
Multinational
Operations
Considerations
Special
Operations
Forces
Slide 14. Multinational Operations
35
Multinational Operations
Multinational operations planning should take into account the following considerations:
political climates, language barriers, cultural backgrounds, military capabilities and training,
equipment interoperability and logistic support system coordination.
When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions
based on each multinational partner’s capabilities. Each nation’s political considerations
will influence its degree of involvement in a specific MOOTW. Early determination and
resolution of these considerations with partner nations during the planning process is critical.
JFCs should plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting
multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different
military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational
partners.
Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to
overcome these detractors. SOF-unique capabilities in language and cross cultural training,
regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions,
make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support multinational
operations objectives. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2c)
36 Military Operations Other Than War
No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their
subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet
specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.
US Unilateral Operations Multinational Operations
Interoperability of
Communication is Critical to
Success
Extend a Communications
Umbrella over Multinational
Forces
Unity
of
Effort
Lead Nation
Option
US Civil
Authorities
Federal,
State, and
Local
Agencies
Parallel
Option
Regional
Alliance
Option
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 12
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
MOOTW Command and Control Options
Slide 15. MOOTW Command and Control Options
37
MOOTW Command and Control Options
No single command and control (C2) option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their
subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific
requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must
be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided.
Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation. In US
unilateral operations, C2 arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US
civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign
operations. C2 arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with
unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies. In a
disaster situation, routine communications may be disrupted and civil authorities may have
to rely on backup communications systems. Military leaders should be prepared to establish
communication linkages with these authorities. Outside the United States, even when US
forces operate unilaterally, some communications links will be required with local civil
authorities or international agencies, depending on the situation.
Planners must be prepared to extend a communications umbrella over multinational forces.
Some effective options for C2 of multinational forces include: the lead nation option, where
a nation agrees to take the lead in the accomplishment of an international mandate. This
simplifies unity of command; the parallel option, which allows multinational partners to
retain greater operational control of their forces. The mandating organization selects a
commander for the force. The force commander has operational control of forces of the
multinational partners, but to a lesser degree than in the lead nation option; the regional
alliance option, which depends on the ability of regional nations to lead a coalition effort.
Existing alliances may serve as a basis for C2 of forces involved in MOOTW. (JP 3-07,
Chapter IV, para 2d)
38 Military Operations Other Than War
The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes
planning for public affairs more important than ever. This is especially critical
in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact.
Public Affairs
•
Open and Independent
Reporting
•
Respond to Media
Queries
Public
Perception
•
Create Environment
That Encourages
Balanced Coverage
•
Pre-Plan Response to
Inaccurate Analysis and
Disinformation
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 13
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Public Affairs
Slide 16. Public Affairs
39
Public Affairs
The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for
public affairs more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW,
where there can be significant political impact. The media can affect the perceived legitimacy
of an operation and, therefore, influence the success or failure of that operation. JFCs
should develop a well-defined and concise public affairs plan to minimize adverse effect
upon the operation by the media, and include their public affairs officer early in the planning
process.
Public affairs plans should provide open and independent reporting and provide ways to
communicate information about an operation to fulfill the US military’s obligation of keeping
the American public informed. Such a plan also enhances force protection to avoid the
media attempts to acquire and publicly disseminate classified information. Public affairs
plans must also anticipate and pre-plan response to possibly inaccurate media analysis. (JP
3-07, Chapter IV, para 2e)
40 Military Operations Other Than War
CA units contain a variety of specialty skill that support MOOTW. CA
capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational
requirements.
Assessments
of Civil
Infrastructure
Civil Affairs
Assist
Operation of
Temporary
Shelters Liaison
Between
Military and
NGOs & PVOs
Culture EXPERTISE
Host-Nation
Support
Social
Structure
JP 3-07, “JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR” 14
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Civil Affairs (CA)
Slide 17. Civil Affairs (CA)
41
Civil Affairs
Civil affairs (CA) units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA
capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units
may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary
shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and PVOs. CA forces
can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations such as culture,
social structure, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting
activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments.
(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2f)
viernes, mayo 14, 2010
¿Existe algo mejor que la indiferencia ? esa hermosa forma de demostrarle a alguien que simplemente no es nada, es decirle a una persona que te interesas mas por la basura que por ella misma, simplemente increíble.
Culpable una ves mas, buscando la exoneracion de los cargos que se me imputan, simplemente que pase el tiempo y yo seguir viviendo con la esperanza, por que un hombre sin esperanza es el que ya esta muerto.
¿Mi futuro? es divertido no saberlo, pero lo mejor es poder soñarlo.
Culpable una ves mas, buscando la exoneracion de los cargos que se me imputan, simplemente que pase el tiempo y yo seguir viviendo con la esperanza, por que un hombre sin esperanza es el que ya esta muerto.
¿Mi futuro? es divertido no saberlo, pero lo mejor es poder soñarlo.
viernes, abril 09, 2010
frustacion, miedo, coraje, envidia, mas frustacion, k pasa por mi mente? k pasa por mi corazon? un poco de tristeza, pero no hay mas k decir, no hay mas k acer, no hay mas k decir, se lo dije una ves, esta no parece mi vida, en estos momentos preferiria ser esclavo, preferiria, estar siendo torturado, a darme cuenta de la verdad, de la cruda verdad, espero no haberla atraido con el pensamiento, pero sinceramente es algo k ya veia venir, y lo peor es k no es algo de lo k kiera hablar, pero tristemente, ya lo sabia .
asi k ahora desmotivado y trsite, nuevamente regreso a los brazos de mi soledad.
no se hable mas naci para estar solo. triste y solo, acompañado de mi soledad.
asi k ahora desmotivado y trsite, nuevamente regreso a los brazos de mi soledad.
no se hable mas naci para estar solo. triste y solo, acompañado de mi soledad.
martes, marzo 23, 2010
cuando uno tiene una corazonada es tonto no hacerle caso, es de tontos ignorarla, cruda verdad
ahora la pregunta es ¿ Como dejar de Sentir? ¿Como dejar de querer?
como ignorar a quien a salvado tu vida, como dejar de suspirar, ?
-[Marcy] dice:
*pues rauly
*uno no sabe lo ke ella piensa
*osea a la mejor sale contigo al cine a comer ect
*pero ella solo lo hace con la intencion de amigo
*o a la mejor ya pasaste a ser un hermano para ella
ahora la pregunta es ¿ Como dejar de Sentir? ¿Como dejar de querer?
como ignorar a quien a salvado tu vida, como dejar de suspirar, ?
lunes, marzo 15, 2010
Ella, la que me provoca suspiros, la que me provoca esta agonia, es demasiado para mi k no me atrevo a hablarle por sentir k no la merezco, ahora cambie a mi Soledad por unos suspiros que me queman por dentro con la esperanza de que pronto se conviertan en algo eterno, con la esperanza de que pronto se conviertan en unos chinos de ojos claros con una hermosa sonrisa eterna
jueves, marzo 11, 2010
me e dado cuenta, ya lo vi, se me van las palabras , aun la veo y me pongo nervioso, diria la cancion de Tracy Chapman " words don´t come easily" su forma de ser me domina , a tal grado que olvido todo de mi y solo pienso en ella, aun asi y con lo dificil que me es pensar al verla , podria decir que se esta protegiendo, todos nosotros somos quien somos por nuestras experiencias, por nuestro ayer, ella en su caso, debe protegerse, y no de mi, la vida es lo que le a enseñado, yo quiero cambiar eso,
primero , debo pensar, what i should do? vaya situacion, rara, pero tengo el consuelo de que me hace feliz, ya sea verla o pensar en ella, eso me hace feliz, pero por ahora, seguire suspirando, seguire contandole al mundo sobre mis besos no dados, sobre mis besos frustrados, sobre lo mucho que pienso en ella, sobre lo mucho que ella me hace feliz .
primero , debo pensar, what i should do? vaya situacion, rara, pero tengo el consuelo de que me hace feliz, ya sea verla o pensar en ella, eso me hace feliz, pero por ahora, seguire suspirando, seguire contandole al mundo sobre mis besos no dados, sobre mis besos frustrados, sobre lo mucho que pienso en ella, sobre lo mucho que ella me hace feliz .
a unos minutos del partido Mx VS nueva Zelanda, y palabras k me sobran para decirte no pueden salir, no son las correctas en este momento, ¿ cuando lo seran ? es la gran incognita, no me voy a preguntar si vale la pena decirtelo ( una ves mas ) , suspiro, cuento del 1 al 10 y sigo suspirando, lamentablemente no me voy a mentir, no te veo nada interasada, no te culpo, ¿como seria posible k tu te fijaras en mi? quiero dejar de suspirar :(
miércoles, marzo 03, 2010
como el titulo lo dice, te robas mis suspiros, me kitas algunos sueños, y me distraes durante el dia, soy feliz por algo k no tengo, no pork no sea mio, sino pork se que existe, se que esta ahi , cada ves que miro sus ojos desvanesco, al principio no sabia si eran cafe claro, o talves un tono de miel, pense en muchos colores, pero al final me di cuenta que era su alma a quien yo veia realmente.
Ironicamente sabes que existo, me ves, y estas ahi, pero continuar escribiendo me hace pensar y eso me da miedo, miedo de que tal ves seas tu la luz de mi vida, pero que tu no quieras que yo ilumine la tuya.
sigo suspirando, esperando pacientemente, haciendo todo lo que puedo, definitivamente me gustas, asi que seguire siendo ese amigo que hasta el momento soy, ese primo adoptivo, ese vecino, esa persona que solo quiere estar contigo.
Ironicamente sabes que existo, me ves, y estas ahi, pero continuar escribiendo me hace pensar y eso me da miedo, miedo de que tal ves seas tu la luz de mi vida, pero que tu no quieras que yo ilumine la tuya.
sigo suspirando, esperando pacientemente, haciendo todo lo que puedo, definitivamente me gustas, asi que seguire siendo ese amigo que hasta el momento soy, ese primo adoptivo, ese vecino, esa persona que solo quiere estar contigo.
sábado, febrero 27, 2010
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